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Non-technical Summary
Equity in private companies is typically hold by a limited number of owners. The investment
in the private company is often a substantial share of the owner’s personal wealth, which
exposes him or her to company-specific risk. The financial situation of the owner therefore
depends to a large degree on the success or failure of the company. For example, owners
of private companies in the US have, on average, 30% of their net worth invested in one
company. This concentrated investment makes them underdiversified. The degree of under-
diversification can be empirically approximated by the share of personal net worth invested
in one company.
Private companies are not only financed by equity from a limited number of owners but
also by bank loans. This type of financing is attractive for owners with a high degree
of underdiversification because it allows the realisation of additional investment projects
without increasing the exposure to company-specific risk further. We therefore expect that
the demand for bank loans increases in underdiversification. For the supply of bank loans
we also expect a positive effect because it was shown that companies of owners with a higher
degree of underdiversification are on average more profitable. Taking both presumptions
together we expect to find that the degree of underdiversification is an important determinant
of the capital structure of private companies. We expect that underdiversification leads to
higher leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
These expectations are tested with data from a survey of private companies from the US.
We find that underdiversification leads to a higher demand for bank loans, measured as the
probability of applying for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey. We cannot
detect an influence on the supply of bank loans, but we cannot exclude the possibility that
supply increases if owners use the degree of underdiversification as a signal for company
quality. Supply of loans is measured as the probability that all loan applications in the three
years prior to the survey have been successful. As expected, we find that a higher degree
of underdiversification increases leverage substantially. Owners try to reduce their exposure
to company-specific risk by a more extensive us of bank financing. If owners obtain bank
financing for the realisation of an investment project, they do not need to increase their
personal investment further. This means that some projects may be realised that would not
be considered without the availability of bank financing.
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This paper identifies the entrepreneur’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk as an important
determinant of the capital structure of private companies. The exposure to idiosyn-
cratic risk is approximated by the share of personal net worth invested in one company
(SNWI). Exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases cost of equity capital since higher
equity returns are required as compensation. This makes bank financing more attrac-
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1 Introduction
Private companies have typically only a limited number of owners, each with a large owner-
ship share. The concentrated ownership helps to overcome control problems caused by the
opaqueness of the business operations. However, it also exposes owners to idiosyncratic risk,
since they often invest a high share of their personal net worth in a single company. Their
personal portfolio is therefore not well diversified. The degree of underdiversification can be
described by the share of net worth invested in one company. If owners require a compensa-
tion for their risk exposure, they have to demand higher returns on their equity investment,
which is equivalent to higher costs of equity capital for the private company. The higher
costs of equity capital makes bank financing relatively more attractive. We therefore expect
that the degree of underdiversification has a positive effect on leverage. The main point of
this paper is an investigation of how owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk influences the
capital structure of private companies. In order to deepen our understanding of the mecha-
nisms at work, we also investigate the effect of underdiversification on loan applications, loan
approvals and the interest rate of loans. Tests for the capital structure have so far neglected
influences that stem from the specific ownership structure of private companies.
The degree of underdiversification is quite substantial in private companies. Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document that, on average, owners of private companies have
invested 30% of their wealth in just one company. This high degree of underdiversification
increases the cost of equity capital for private companies as shown by Kerins et al. (2004).
The authors employ the CAPM to simulate the cost of equity capital for an underdiversified
entrepreneur who is able to invest in both the own company and the stock market using an
investment solely in the stock market for comparison. The relative weights of the investment
in the company and the stock market determine the total risk of the portfolio. The total risk
can be duplicated by borrowing money and investing the own resources and the borrowed
money in the stock market. The expected returns on such a levered market investment is the
opportunity cost of equity capital for an underdiversified entrepreneur, which is calculated
for different assumed levels of underdiversification. The model predicts an increase of 9.8
percentage points in the opportunity cost of equity capital for a small company if underdiver-
sification increases by 10%. This is a substantial increase considering that annual returns for
public equity, as calculated by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), are 11.0%, 14.6%
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and 24.7% for the time periods 1990-92, 1993-95 and 1996-98 respectively. The returns to
public equity can be used as a benchmark for the cost of equity capital if investors can
diversify, since the returns do not include a compensation for exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
The large effect of underdiversification was not only found in the simulation by Kerins
et al. (2004), it was also shown that higher underdiversification is related to higher realised
equity returns for a sample of private companies in the US (Mueller (2004)). Profitabil-
ity increases since owners require higher returns as a compensation for their exposure to
idiosyncratic risk and owner-managers work more since they are more dependent on the
success of the company. For owners unrelated to management, the study finds an effect
of underdiversification similar in size to the results of Kerins et al. (2004). An increase
in underdiversification of 10 percentage points increases the return on equity by 9.2 per-
centage points. Both the simulation and the empirical analysis show that the influence of
underdiversification is substantial.
The main topic of this paper is the influence of owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk on
the capital structure of private companies. Empirically, we can only identify the reduced
form for leverage, since we have no variables that would shift only the demand or only
the supply function of leverage. However, since we observe applications for new loans and
the approval or denial of loan applications, we can infer whether demand or supply forces
drive a change in leverage in the reduced form. Leverage is the result of decisions on bank
financing over time; in this sense it is a stock variable. We gain a deeper understanding
of the determinants of leverage by investigating the determinants of the flow variables loan
application and loan approval as well.
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF) from the year 1998. The survey is well suited for our analysis since it provides
information both on the financial structure of private companies and the personal wealth of
their owners. It allows us to study the demand for new bank loans since we observe whether
a company has applied for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey. The supply
of new loans is included as well. We know whether the loan applications three years prior to
the survey were approved or denied. In addition, it includes detailed characteristics of the
most recent loan. The survey reports the interest rate, whether a fixed or a variable rate
is used and whether collateral is required. Since we observe total debt and total assets, we
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can calculate the capital structure of private companies. We measure underdiversification
empirically as the share of personal net worth that the largest owner has invested in his or
her company.1
Several hypotheses about the consequences of underdiversification for the financing of
private companies are tested. Since underdiversification increases the cost of equity capital,
we expect a higher demand for bank financing from more highly underdiversified owners.
This would be the consequence if owners try to equalise the marginal cost of equity and debt
capital. A more extensive use of bank loans helps to reduce the financial commitment of
the owner. Our first hypothesis is that owners with a higher degree of underdiversification
exhibit a higher probability of applying for a new loan. Since profitability is increasing in
underdiversification, we also expect that the supply of loans increases with underdiversifi-
cation. Banks have no disutility from the underdiversification of the owner but gain from
higher profitability, so they should be willing to lend more. We hypothesise that underdi-
versification increases the probability of loan approval. We have no clear expectation with
regard to the change in the interest rate. If the demand function is decreasing in the interest
rate and the supply function is increasing in the interest rate, then the consequences of an
increase in underdiversification for the equilibrium interest rate is unclear. The effect de-
pends on whether demand or supply shifts more. With respect to leverage our expectations
are unequivocal again. If both demand for and supply of bank loans increases in underdi-
versification, it follows that leverage increases in underdiversification as well. This is the
central point of interest of this paper. Higher cost of equity capital for owners with a higher
degree of underdiversification should lead to a more extensive use of bank financing reflected
in higher leverage.
Most of the hypotheses are confirmed by the data. More underdiversified owners con-
fronted with higher costs of equity capital evince a higher demand for bank loans. The
probability that a company makes an application for a new loan in the three years preceding
the survey is increasing in underdiversification. For supply of loans we find no effect of under-
diversification, but we cannot exclude the possibility that underdiversification increases the
1This study has been widely used for empirical analysis, see, for example Berger and Udell (1995) and
Petersen and Rajan (1994) for studies on lending relationships or Ang et al. (2000) and Bitler et al. (2005)
for analyses of agency conflicts in private companies.
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supply of loans insofar as underdiversification is used to signal company profitability. We do
not find a significant influence on the equilibrium interest rate which is consistent with two
possible market constellations. Since we find an increase in demand we conclude that either
supply is increasing as well to offset the effect of an increase in demand or that the supply
function is flat in the interest rate and not shifting in the share of net worth invested. As
hypothesised, the degree of underdiversification has a positive and large effect on leverage.
A one standard deviation increase in the share of net worth invested leads, ceteris paribus,
to an increase in leverage of 18.5 percentage points. This is substantial, especially when
considering that average leverage in the sample is 32.6%. Underdiversification is therefore
an important determinant of the capital structure of private companies.
The empirical results have important implications for our understanding of the financing of
private companies. We find that entrepreneurs who are more exposed to the idiosyncratic risk
of their companies use bank financing more extensively. Bank financing allows them to grow
their companies without increasing their risk exposure further. Alternatively, entrepreneurs
can use bank financing to reduce their own investment if they keep company size constant.
Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capital and accordingly the
required returns of an investment project, this also means that the availability of bank loans
makes the realisation of some investment projects profitable that would not be realised in
its absence. Bank financing decreases the returns that are required for the realisation of an
investment project.
This paper studies how the degree of underdiversification, one characteristic of the finan-
cial situation of owners, affects the capital structure of a private company. There is a related
literature studying other aspects of owners’ financial situation. Cressy (1996) analyses data
on bank overdrafts from UK startup companies with respect to loan conditions and company
survival. He finds that banks agree to higher overdraft limits if more collateral, measured as
house equity, is available. Furthermore, it is evident that survival probability is increased if
an entrepreneur used personal funds in starting up. Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002) also test
whether personal wealth affects the availability of bank loans. The authors find that greater
private wealth increases probability of loan approval since personal assets can be used as
collateral for business loans.
This paper is also related to the literature studying the determinants of the capital struc-
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ture of private companies. Up to know, this literature has not taken the financial situation
of the corresponding owners into consideration. Giannetti (2003), for example, focuses on
differences between countries. The study aims to identify the importance of legal rules and
financial development for capital structure. One of the results is that companies in countries
with institutions favouring creditor rights have, on average, higher leverage. Chittenden
et al. (1996) concentrate on the influence of company characteristics. The authors find a
negative effect of profitability, size and age on the leverage of private companies. The ability
to provide collateral from inside the company is proxied for by the ratio of fixed to total
assets, which has a positive effect.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothe-
ses and describes the estimation strategy; Section 3 explains the data set and defines the
variables; Section 4 shows the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
In this section we derive the hypotheses that we are going to test. The main interest of
the paper is the question of how entrepreneurs’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk influences the
capital structure of private companies. We approach this question in a step-wise procedure.
We first derive hypotheses about how underdiversification affects the demand for and the
supply of loans. Next we derive the implications of changes in demand and supply for
the equilibrium interest rate. Finally, we bring our considerations together and develop a
hypothesis for the relationship between underdiversification and leverage.
The simulation by Kerins et al. (2004) suggests that underdiversification, which is calcu-
lated as the share of net worth invested in one company, increases the cost of equity capital.
The mechanism at work is that rational owners will demand a compensation for their ex-
posure to idiosyncratic risk. Since owners who maximise company value will try to achieve
equality of marginal cost of equity and debt capital, we expect that owners with a higher
degree of underdiversification will demonstrate a higher demand for bank loans. Owners
can use bank loans to reduce their own financial commitment in case the company does not
grow or to grow the company without additional personal investment. We derive the first
hypothesis accordingly:
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Hypothesis 1 (demand for loans): Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification exhibit
a higher probability of applying for a new loan in a given time period.
It has been empirically shown that underdiversification is related to higher company
profitability due to owners requiring higher returns and owner-managers working harder to
ensure the companies’ success (Mueller (2004)). Since banks do not suffer from the underdi-
versification of owners, rather gaining from the higher profitability involved, we expect that
banks are more willing to lend to owners with higher degrees of underdiversification.
Hypothesis 2 (supply of loans): The probability of loan approval is higher for loan applications
filed by more highly underdiversified owners.
In addition, we are interested in the effect underdiversification has on the interest rate of
bank loans and on leverage. Interest rates and leverage are equilibrium values, a result of both
the demand for and supply of external financing. Empirically, a structural model is needed
to separately identify the demand and the supply function for external financing, in our case
more specifically for leverage. Unfortunately, the data set does not include variables that
would shift only the demand or only the supply curve. It is therefore not possible to identify
the structural model. Nevertheless, we can calculate reduced form effects for interest rate and
leverage and deduce from them how underdiversification affects the respective equilibrium
values.
Owners who maximise company value will choose leverage such that the marginal cost
of debt and equity capital are equal. Since we do not observe marginal costs of capital in
our data, we use the interest rate of each firm’s most recent loan as an approximation. This
interest rate reflects the average cost of the firms’ latest additions to debt finance.
Although the empirical analysis does not allow us to identify the coefficients of the struc-
tural model, it is nevertheless helpful to write it out since we can make predictions for the
reduced form coefficients by hypothesising about the signs of the coefficients in the structural
form. In the following simplified demand and supply functions, represented in equations (1)
and (2), we consider underdiversification as the only shift variable to keep notation simple.
Underdiversification is approximated by the share of net worth invested (SNWI). The vari-
able ir stands for the nominal interest rate. It denotes any potential value of the interest
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rate that fulfills either the demand or the supply function. It is not an equilibrium value.
levd and levs denotes demand for and supply of leverage.2
levd(ir) = α1 + γ1ir + β1SNWI + 1 (1)
levs(ir) = α2 + γ2ir + β2SNWI + 2 (2)
The data set only provides us with information on the equilibrium value of leverage, lev,
and the equilibrium interest rate of each firm’s most recent loan, ir, equating demand and
supply.
lev = levs(ir) = levd(ir) (3)
Using this equilibrium condition, we can equate the demand- and supply-side value of
leverage in (1) and (2) and solve for the reduced form of the interest rate.
ir =
α2 − α1
γ1 − γ2 +
β2 − β1
γ1 − γ2 SNWI +
2 − 1
γ1 − γ2 (4)
Equivalently, introducing new notation for the coefficients that can be identified, the
reduced form can be written as:
ir = pi11 + pi12SNWI + ν1 (5)
We will now describe our expectations concerning the signs of the coefficients in the
structural form in order to deduce predictions for the signs in the reduced form. We can
test the predictions for the reduced form with out data. In standard demand equations the
demand of a good decreases in its price. There is no evidence in the literature that demand
for external financing would behave in a non-standard way. We therefore expect that γ1
in equation (1) is negative.3 Since underdiversification increases the cost of equity capital,
2We proceed here according to the excellent discussion of simultaneous equations models in Wooldridge
(2002, p. 209ff.).
3Freixas and Rochet (1997, p. 140) choose a standard demand function for loans in their theoretical
discussion of credit rationing. Furthermore, information contained in the SSBF suggests a standard demand
function as well. 16% of respondents mention a low interest rate as reason for choosing the bank from which
they obtained their most recent loan. The only reason with higher importance is a long-term relationship or
personal contacts (23% of respondents).
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we expect more underdiversified owners to have a higher demand for leverage (β1 positive).
For the supply equation we need to differentiate two situations: First, it is possible that
supply of external financing increases in the interest rate. In this case γ2 is positive. Second,
supply of external financing may be insensitive to the interest rate. Problems of asymmetric
information can lead banks to adjust interest rates to the riskiness of a company only to a
certain degree. Companies with higher leverage have a higher financial risk, but it can be
profit maximising for banks not to charge higher interest rates for them. On the one hand,
there is a problem of adverse selection. If interest rates are high it may be only worthwhile
for entrepreneurs with low quality projects to apply for a loan. On the other hand, there
is a moral hazard problem. With high interest rates entrepreneurs have more incentives to
increase the risk of the project after they have obtained a loan. If the problems of adverse
selection are severe and if the bank has not enough funds to serve all loan applicants at the
profit maximising interest rate, a situation of credit rationing can obtain (Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). The implications of a price-insensitive supply function for γ2 can best be illustrated
by first solving the supply of leverage (2) for the interest rate:
irs(lev) = −α2
γ2
+
1
γ2
lev − β2
γ2
SNWI − 1
γ2
2 (6)
If the interest rate is not adjusted to the degree of leverage, then the coefficient of leverage
will be zero. In this case γ2 in equation (2) is one divided by zero, i.e. positive infinity. The
last remaining coefficient to be signed is β2. Considering the better performance of companies
with underdiversified owners, we expect that, in a competitive environment, banks offer a
larger volume of financing to more underdiversified owners (β2 positive).
For the case of a standard supply function, i.e. γ2 finite positive, the sign of pi12 in the
reduced form (5) depends on the relative extent of the demand and supply shifts due to
SNWI. The term γ1 − γ2 in the denominator is always negative. β2 relates to the shift in
the supply function and β1 relates to the shift in the demand function. If the shift in the
supply function exceeds that of the demand function (β2− β1 positive), then pi12 is negative
and a lower interest rate is predicted for higher values of underdiversification. However, if
the shift in the demand function exceeds the shift in the supply function (β2− β1 negative),
the relationship between underdiversification and interest rate will be positive. Intuitively,
there are two conflicting influences at work. On the one hand, underdiversification can
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function as a signal of company profitability, hence decreasing the interest rate charged by
banks. Mueller (2004) shows that underdiversification leads to higher company profitability
because owners require a higher return for selected projects and owners who are at the same
time managers work harder to ensure the success of the company. On the other hand, more
highly underdiversified owners face higher costs of capital and are therefore willing to pay
higher interest rates in order to obtain bank loans. In the case of a price-insensitive supply
function SNWI has no effect on the interest rate, i.e. γ2 infinity, we expect no influence of
SNWI on the interest rate.
Hypothesis 3 (interest rate): With a standard supply function the relationship between the
interest rate on a firm’s most recent loan and underdiversification is ambiguous. If the shift
in the demand curve is smaller (larger) than the shift in the supply curve, then SNWI will
have a negative (positive) effect on the interest rate. With a price-insensitive supply function
SNWI has no effect on the interest rate.
For the equilibrium value of leverage it is possible to derive an unambiguous prediction.
After multiplying equations (1) and (2) by γ2 and γ1 respectively, we solve both equations
for γ1γ2ir, set them equal and solve for the equilibrium value of leverage, lev. We thus obtain
the reduced form for leverage:
lev =
γ1α2 − γ2α1
γ1 − γ2 +
γ1β2 − γ2β1
γ1 − γ2 SNWI +
γ12 − γ21
γ1 − γ2 (7)
Or simplified:
lev = pi21 + pi22SNWI + ν2 (8)
We first discuss the case of a finite γ2. According to the discussion of the signs of γ1, β1,
γ2 and β2, it follows that pi22 will be positive: γ1 − γ2 is always negative, the term γ1β2 is
negative, and the term γ2β1 is positive. We therefore expect a positive relationship between
underdiversification and leverage in the reduced form. Both demand and supply factors tend
to indicate greater leverage for higher values of SNWI. We also obtain this prediction in the
case of an infinitive γ2. Employing the rule of l‘Hospital, we find that the limit of pi22 for γ2
infinity is equal to β1 and therefore positive.
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Hypothesis 4 (leverage): Companies whose owners have a higher degree of underdiversifica-
tion have greater leverage.
3 Data
The Survey of Small Business Finances 1998 (SSBF), which is conducted by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, is used for the empirical analysis.
The survey provides information on 3,561 private companies with up to 500 employees from
non-agricultural and non-financial sectors in the US. This survey is well suited for our study
because it provides information both on the financial situation of a private company and on
the personal wealth of its largest owner. The survey has a detailed section on bank financing.
We learn whether companies have applied for bank loans in the years prior to the survey,
whether they were successful with their applications and, if successful, what interest rate
they had to pay. The investigation is restricted to the survey’s 1998 edition since those
previous do not include information on the personal wealth of the largest owner.4
The main concern of this paper is the influence of underdiversification on the capital
structure of private companies. We measure underdiversification as the ratio of the largest
owner’s equity investment to the net worth of the largest owner, i.e., as the share of net
worth invested (SNWI). Net worth is defined as the book value of the equity investment
plus the equity value of the primary residence plus the sum of all assets minus the sum of
all other liabilities of the largest owner.
Two measures of underdiversification are calculated. The first measure, denoted with
SNWI A, considers only the value of the equity investment.
SNWI A =
(ownership share ∗ book value of equity)
net worth
The second measure, SNWI B, takes into account that the equity investment is not the
only way in which the owners’ assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give personal
guarantees for company loans, use private assets as collateral and extend loans to the com-
pany. The survey includes information on the extent of these activities for all of the owners
4Detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
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combined. This information is therefore multiplied by the ownership share of the largest
owner to produce an approximation of that owner’s personal involvement.
SNWI B =
ownership share ∗ (book value of equity + guarantees+ collateral + loans)
net worth
The measures SNWI A and SNWI B document a considerable degree of underdiversifica-
tion. SNWI A has an average of 25.8%. By additionally considering guarantees, collateral
and loans, the average value of SNWI B increases by six percentage points.
Share of net worth invested is an approximation of the risk exposure of owners due to
their equity investment in a private company. Owners are exposed to several types of risk.
For example, there is a concentration of income from one source and the possibility that
the value of the ownership share could fall. These risks certainly increase with SNWI.
However, in order to completely describe the risk exposure of owners, it would be necessary
to have information on all assets in the owners’ portfolio and the correlation structure of their
returns. For instance, if an owner has invested in the stock market and the returns on his
or her private company exhibit a negative correlation with the returns on the stock market,
his or her risk exposure is lower compared to a situation in which returns are positively
correlated. Since the survey has no information from which the correlation of returns could
be deduced, we must rely on size of equity investment relative to net worth as a proxy for risk
exposure. We use industry dummies to control for return characteristics of private equity
that are identical within an industry.5
The survey covers the demand for and the supply of loans at the company level. The
variable loan application is equal to 1 if an application for a new loan had been filed in
the three years preceding the survey and 0 otherwise. Loan renewals are not counted. Loan
approval is set equal to 1 if the loan applications filed by the company in question in the
three years preceding the survey had always been approved. It is coded as 0 if at least one
5SNWI can be used as a measure of underdiversification for owners with limited and unlimited liability.
Even owners with unlimited liability lose only their equity investment in the case of bankruptcy if their
private assets are below exemption limits stipulated by bankruptcy laws. According to Fan and White
(2003, p. 3) this is often the case.
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loan application has been denied. Companies which have not applied for a new loan in the
last three years are not included in this variable.
Besides the variable for underdiversification, SNWI, we use ownership share as control
variable when investigating loan applications and loan approvals. Ownership share is
defined as the share of equity owned by the largest owner. We also control for company
size, measured by number of employees, and company age, defined as the number of years
since the company was founded or acquired. All regressions include industry dummies
defined at the 1-digit SIC level, the entrepreneurial work experience of the largest owner,
measured as number of years owning or managing a company, and dummies for legal form
differentiating between sole proprietorships, partnerships, S- and C-corporations.6
As is described in detail in the next subsection, we need to control for potential endo-
geneity of some regressors. We employ specific characteristics of the owner and the company
as instruments. Owner age is the age of the largest owner measured in years. Owner sex
dummy takes the value 1 for female owners and the value 0 for male owners. The type
of company acquisition is also used. ‘Company founded’ is the base category; company
purchased and company inherited is covered by dummies.
We estimate reduced forms for the cost of a bank loan and for the leverage of a company.
Interest rate is the nominal interest rate the company has to pay for its most recent loan.
The lowest and highest 1% of the observations are trimmed in order to eliminate implausible
values. Risk premium is defined as the difference between the interest rate on a company’s
most recent loan and the yield of a US government security with the same maturity as the
loan. This variable covers only the portion of the interest rate that exceeds the cost of a
riskless loan.
We include three controls in the interest rate regressions that are meant to capture the
economy-wide interest rate level at the time of loan application. The variable default
spread reflects the market price for risk in corporate bonds. It is defined as the difference
between the average yield on corporate bonds rated ‘Baa’ by Moody’s and the yield on US
government securities with a ten year maturity. The prime rate is included as a general
6C- and S-corporations are both characterised by limited liability. C-corporations have to pay corporation
tax for profits that are paid out to the shareholders, whereas profits of S-corporations are only charged with
the personal income tax rate of their owners.
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control for the price of corporate bonds. It is defined by The Wall Street Journal as “the
base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75% of the nation’s 30 largest banks”. It
is the risk-free rate plus the risk premium for a bank’s best customers. The variable term
structure spread is the difference between the yield of a US government security of the
same maturity as a company’s loan minus the yield of a US government security with a one
year maturity. This variable is set to zero for loans with a variable interest rate and for loans
without fixed maturity. Information on the three controls for the economy-wide interest level
is obtained from the FRED II database provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
This database can be accessed via http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Finally, for the reduced form of leverage, we define leverage as the sum of all liabilities
of the company divided by its total assets (sum of equity and liabilities).
Only companies with positive equity values are included in the analysis because it is
otherwise not possible to derive SNWI.7 In addition, companies are required to have positive
sales and assets and owners are required to have positive private wealth. 2,666 companies
are eventually included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables can be
found in Table A in the appendix. Table B in the appendix provides an overview of the
distribution of the companies according to industry.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Endogeneity of Regressors
In the empirical analysis we need to be concerned with the potential endogeneity of the
regressors share of net worth invested (SNWI) and ownership share. This can be illustrated
for the case of the leverage regression. First, there is the problem of reverse causality.
Owners may adapt the share of net worth invested (SNWI) in response to the availability
of bank loans. Better companies may find it easier to obtain bank loans, which will allow
their owners to grow the company without increasing equity. Reverse causality introduces
721% of the companies have negative equity values. Equity value is not requested explicitly in the survey
but is calculated as the difference of the company’s total assets and liabilities. It is possible that assets are
under- or liabilities over-reported because most respondents are not required by law to draw up a balance
sheet.
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a negative relationship between leverage and SNWI. Part of this reverse causality problem
would be mitigated if we could perfectly control for company quality. The ownership share
of a firm’s largest owner can also be influenced by the availability of bank loans and, as a
result, by leverage. If bank financing is not available and a firm’s original owner has too few
resources to meet the total investment required, it may be necessary to take on an additional
owner.
Second, we need to be wary of measurement error. Most of the small companies included in
the SSBF are not required by law to draw up a balance sheet. Therefore, the measurement of
the assets and liabilities of these companies will be imprecise; leverage will be measured with
error. Furthermore, since book value of equity is not requested explicitly but calculated as
the difference between total assets and total liabilities, the measurement error is transferred
to the regressor SNWI.8
To deal with the mentioned problems of endogeneity we use specific owner and company
characteristics as instruments of SNWI and ownership share. Table 1 shows the first stage
regression results. The first instrument is the age of the largest owner. Heaton and Lucas
(2000) show that investment in private equity changes with age; this instrument should thus
be related to SNWI. From columns (1) and (2) it can be seen that owner age, measured in
years, has a significant negative influence on underdiversification. Older owners have had
more time to build up wealth outside the company by saving from income. The income
can be either from a company or wage income from employment. Underdiversification will
therefore be lower for more experienced entrepreneurs. Since experience can be related to our
dependent variables, we need to directly control for the work experience of the largest owner
in the second stage regression. It is to be expected, for example, that more experienced
owners will find it easier to obtain bank loans. By using experience as an explicit control, we
use only the part of SNWI that can be explained by age excluding the years already spent
as entrepreneur.
Further instruments are owner sex and type of company acquisition. These variables
can affect owners’ financial involvement, but since the regressions contain many controls for
company characteristics such as size and age, they should be unrelated to the financial struc-
8This measurement error is non-standard because the same error is affecting both the dependent and an
independent variable.
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Table 1: First Stage Regression Results
Dep. variable: SNWI A SNWI B Ownership share
(1) (2) (3)
Owner age -0.339*** -0.426*** -0.078
(0.058) (0.066) (.050)
Owner sex dummy -2.68** -3.55*** -0.987
(1.18) (1.32) (0.933)
Company purchased 5.35*** 5.86*** -1.40
(1.25) (1.42) (1.15)
Company inherited 7.12*** 5.40** -3.65*
(2.15) (2.38) (2.10)
Number of observations 2666 2666 2666
Joint significance of
excluded instruments, χ2(4) 68.2*** 72.4*** 8.00*
Shea’s partial R squared 0.028 0.028 0.003
R squared 0.126 0.169 0.425
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions contain additional controls for company size, company
age, industry, experience and legal form.
ture of each company. The owner sex dummy shows that women are less underdiversified.
Owners who purchased or inherited their company are more underdiversified than founding
owners. When founding a company, owners have the opportunity to choose a more limited
investment. These instruments are individually significant at least at the 5% level and are
jointly significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the instruments for ownership share of the
largest owner are quite weak. As can be seen from column (3), the only significant effect
is a reduced ownership share for companies that have been inherited. The negative effect
is plausible since ownership will often be divided between several heirs. The instruments
are jointly significant to only the 10% level. In addition, Shea’s partial R squared (see Shea
(1997)) is very low at 0.003. The weak instruments make it difficult to establish an influence
of ownership share in the second stage regressions. However, in this paper’s analysis this
regressor is only of secondary interest.
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4.2 Demand for Bank Loans
Underdiversification sharply increases the cost of equity capital because it exposes owners to
idiosyncratic risk for which they may require a compensation. More underdiversified owners
can therefore be expected to express a higher demand for bank loans as an alternative source
of financing. This is the prediction of Hypothesis 1, which we test in this subsection. Bank
loans allow underdiversified owners to reduce their financial exposure to the company.
Table 2 presents probit regressions on demand for bank loans. The dependent variable
‘loan application’ is equal to 1 if an application for a new loan had been filed in the three
years preceding the survey and 0 otherwise. For the probit regressions including instrumented
endogenous regressors, we follow the approach developed by Newey (1987). Both measures
of underdiversification are used as controls. SNWI A only considers equity investment when
calculating degree of financial exposure, whereas SNWI B additionally includes personal
assets used as collateral, personal guarantees for company loans and loans to the company.
We only report one specification with SNWI B since the signs of the coefficients and the
significance levels are always identical for SNWI A and SNWI B.
The OLS specification in column (1) shows a higher demand for bank loans for owners
with higher values of SNWI, but the result is affected by reverse causality. If owners decide,
for whatever reason, not to use bank loans as a means of financing their company, they must
rely more heavily on their own resources; this increases SNWI. The negative coefficient of
ownership share may have several reasons, one being differences in capital intensity. A high
capital intensity may simultaneously lead to a smaller ownership share of the largest owner,
since the contributions of several owners are needed, and to a higher demand for external
financing. The results also show that larger and younger companies exhibit a higher demand
for new loans.
In the IV regressions in columns (2) to (4) we control for reverse causality. The basic
specification in column (2) supports Hypothesis 1; SNWI increases the probability of loan
applications. Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification approach banks more
often in order to obtain additional funds. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
SNWI A leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase of 30.6 percentage points in probability of loan
application. As in the data set probability of applying for a new loan is only 25.4%, the
influence of underdiversification is quite substantial. The coefficient of ownership share is
16
Table 2: Probit Estimations – Demand for New Loans
Dep. variable Loan application
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
SNWI A 0.534*** 3.91*** 3.09***
(0.110) (1.03) (0.829)
SNWI B 3.43***
(0.795)
Ownership share -0.219* 5.70* 4.24 3.78
(0.124) (3.33) (2.85) (2.98)
Leverage 1.50***
(0.157)
Company size 0.0019*** 0.0035 0.0021 0.0013
(0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Company age -0.0122*** -0.0038 -0.0024 -0.0030
(0.0030) (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0058)
Number of observations 2666 2666 2666 2666
Pseudo R squared 0.052 0.056 0.094 0.056
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable ‘loan application’ equals 1 if an application for a new
loan had been filed in the three preceding years. SNWI and ownership share are instrumented in the IV
specifications. SNWI, ownership share and leverage are expressed as ratios. The regressions also include
controls for industry, experience and legal form.
now positive at a marginal significance level. Owners who choose a high personal ownership
share to have control over the company may need more bank financing for their investment
opportunities.
The additional specifications are intended as a robustness check. In column (3) we include
a control for leverage. Companies with higher leverage – i.e., companies who have more
often applied for loans in the past – are more likely to apply for new loans in the present as
well. In column (4) we employ our second measure of underdiversification, SNWI B. Both
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modifications confirm that underdiversification increases demand for bank loans. Overall,
we find evidence that is consistent with the idea that owners try to lighten the burden of
underdiversification by more extensive use of bank financing.
4.3 Supply of Bank Loans
The success of loan applications can be influenced by the underdiversification of owners, since
underdiversification increases companies’ profitability (Mueller (2004)). The mechanisms
identified by the author are higher required returns as a compensation for the exposure to
idiosyncratic risk and increased effort. Since banks gain from higher profitability but do
not suffer a disutility from the underdiversification of the owners, Hypothesis 2 postulates
a positive effect of underdiversification on loan approvals. We use the information from
the SSBF data on whether the companies’ applications for new loans were successful. The
dependent variable of the probit regressions in Table 3 is set equal to 1 if the loan applications
filed by the company in question in the three previous years had always been approved and
equal to 0 if at least one loan application has been denied. Companies without an application
for a new loan are not considered in this analysis.
The OLS results in column (1) display a significant negative relationship between SNWI
and approval of loan applications. However, this result is likely driven by reverse causality.
If a loan application is not approved and the owner concerned wishes to proceed with the
investments as originally planned, one option is to use his or her own resources instead. This
contributes to the negative relationship between loan approvals and SNWI. Of the other
regressors, both company size and company age have a positive influence on loan approvals.
Banks are more likely to extend loans to larger and older companies because they are less
risky.
After we eliminate the reverse causality effect by instrumenting SNWI and ownership
share in columns (2) to (4), we find that SNWI is unrelated to loan approvals. This is not
necessarily evidence that banks do not consider SNWI for their loan decisions because we
cannot detect signalling strategies here. In the IV regressions we only use the aspects of
SNWI that can be explained with instruments. These aspects are unrelated to company
profitability. However, signalling company quality with SNWI relies precisely on the portion
of SNWI that cannot be mechanically explained with factors unrelated to company prof-
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Table 3: Probit Estimations – Supply of New Loans
Dep. variable Loan approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
SNWI A -0.503** -1.06 -1.49
(0.224) (2.45) (1.99)
SNWI B -0.856
(1.63)
Ownership share -0.172 -1.88 -2.26 -1.54
(0.270) (2.43) (2.37) (2.25)
Leverage 0.165
(0.480)
Company size 0.0048*** 0.0040 0.0039 0.0043
(0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Company age 0.0253*** 0.0226** 0.0223** 0.0235**
(0.0087) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0096)
Number of observations 676 676 676 676
Pseudo R squared 0.120 0.113 0.122 0.113
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ‘Loan approval’ is coded as 1 if the considered company’s loan applications had
always been approved in the previous three years, and as zero if at least one had been denied. SNWI and
ownership share are instrumented in the IV specifications. SNWI, ownership share and leverage are expressed
as ratios. The regressions also include controls for industry, experience and legal form.
itability. We therefore need to leave the question of whether underdiversification increases
probability of a loan approval open; we cannot determine a definite conclusion for Hypoth-
esis 2. It is possible that underdiversification has no effect on loan approval or that it has a
positive effect through a signalling strategy. For the other controls we determine a positive
effect for company age but no effect for leverage.
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4.4 Reduced Form for Interest Rate
A priori, the effect underdiversification has on a bank loan’s interest rate is not clear. A
positive or negative effect of underdiversification is possible depending on whether the de-
mand or the supply function for loans shifts more. We established empirically that demand
for bank loans increases with underdiversification. For supply of bank loans we did not find
an effect but could not rule out that it is positive. With the reduced form for the interest
rate we can establish whether demand or supply dominate.
For the interest rate specification it is less clear whether instruments are required. With
respect to reverse causality it can be argued that owners who only receive bank loans with
high interest rates will find it relatively more attractive to invest their own money and will
therefore have higher values of SNWI. The effect should, however, remain slight. The OLS
specification has the advantage that it can detect whether owners use high values of SNWI
to signal company quality in order to obtain cheaper loans.
Table 4 shows the reduced form for the interest rate. SNWI has a negative sign in the
OLS regression in column (1), but no significant effect is discernable. A higher ownership
share increases the interest rate. If a high ownership share is a sign that the owner values
control, it is possible that such an owner is willing to pay a higher interest rate for a bank
loan because this type of financing allows the owner to keep more control in an expansion.
Larger companies obtain cheaper loans but company age is irrelevant. We also control for
the economy-wide level of interest rates with default spread, prime rate and term structure
spread. The variables help to identify the company-specific components of the interest
rate but have no significant coefficients themselves. In addition, we control for many loan
characteristics. The coefficients of these controls are not shown for brevity. The reduced
form of the interest rate contains only information for companies that have been successful
with their loan application. It is a sub sample of the companies included in the previous
subsection on loan supply.
The remaining specifications apply instruments for SNWI and ownership share. The
specifications in columns (2) and (3) take the interest rate of the considered company’s
most recent loan as their dependent variable, whereas the specifications in columns (4)
and (5) use the loan’s risk premium. The results in columns (2) to (5) are quite similar.
Underdiversification has no significant effect on interest rate. The effect of SNWI on demand
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Table 4: Reduced Form for Cost of a Bank Loan
Dep. variable Interest Rate Risk Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Company controls
SNWI A -0.0043 -0.0244 -0.0223
(0.0031) (0.0425) (0.0404)
SNWI B -0.0286 -0.0269
(0.0338) (0.0322)
Ownership share 0.0089*** 0.0747 0.0823* 0.0651 0.0726
(0.0034) (0.0473) (0.0488) (0.0454) (0.0469)
Company size -0.0031** 0.0032 0.0046 0.0025 0.0039
(0.0013) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0053)
Company age -0.0144 -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0100 -0.0096
(0.0093) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0154)
Interest rate controls
Default spread 0.0854 0.287 0.369 0.609** 0.649**
(0.418) (0.511) (0.541) (0.316) (0.334)
Prime rate 0.520 1.09* 1.10*
(0.471) (0.620) (0.642)
Term structure spread 0.188 0.962 1.06
(0.361) (0.671) (0.699)
Number of observations 570 570 570 570 570
Overidentification test χ2 2.01 1.46 2.05 1.49
(dof, p-value) (2, 0.37) (2, 0.48) (2, 0.36) (2, 0.48)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership share are instrumented. The
regression contains the following characteristics of the loan: loan type, compensating balance required,
guarantee required, collateral required and presence of fixed interest rate. The regressions also include
controls for industry, experience and legal form.
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for and supply of leverage leads to a new equilibrium situation in which the interest rate
remains largely unchanged. With respect to hypothesis 3 we can conclude that neither a
shift in demand for nor in supply of leverage dominates. Ownership share is significant at
the 10% level only in column (3). The controls for the economy-wide interest level are only
partially significant. We find an influence of the prime rate in column (2) and (3) and an
influence of the default spread in columns (4) and (5). The test of overidentifying restrictions
is also shown in Table 4. It shows that the instruments are valid from a statistical point of
view.
4.5 Reduced Form for Leverage
In this subsection we discuss the influence of underdiversification on the equilibrium value of
leverage. We restrict our attention to a reduced form specification since we cannot identify
demand and supply separately. From simulations of changes in the cost of equity capital
using the CAPM and data on newly public companies by Kerins et al. (2004), we would
expect a sizable positive effect of underdiversification on leverage. The authors calculate for
small companies with 26–100 employees that a change in SNWI from 15% to 25% increases
the cost of equity capital for an underdiversified entrepreneur by 9.8 percentage points.
The cost of equity increases since the entrepreneur is more exposed to idiosyncratic risk of
the company. This considerable change in the cost of equity capital should lead to large
adjustments in the capital structure of private companies. In Hypothesis 4 we stipulate
accordingly a positive influence of underdiversification on leverage. In the previous probit
regressions we could establish that underdiversification increases the demand for new loans.
For loan supply we found no effect or a positive effect. Taking changes in demand and supply
together it is possible that underdiversification has a positive influence on leverage.
Table 5 displays the effect of underdiversification on leverage. The coefficient of SNWI
is positive and significant to the 1% level. The influence of underdiversification on the
equilibrium value of leverage is quite large. The calculation for the specification in column
(1) shows that a one standard deviation increase in SNWI A leads, ceteris paribus, to an
increase in leverage of 18.5 percentage points. This is substantial indeed, especially when
considering that average leverage in the sample is 32.6%. The empirical results clearly
confirm Hypothesis 4: Underdiversification leads to a sizable increase in leverage.
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Table 5: Reduced Form for Leverage
Dep. variable: Leverage
(1) (2)
IV IV
SNWI A 0.736***
(0.222)
SNWI B 0.648***
(0.163)
Ownership share 1.09 0.726
(0.738) (0.636)
Company size 0.095 0.053
(0.072) (0.065)
Company age -0.097 -0.082
(0.144) (0.119)
Number of observations 2666 2666
Overidentification test, χ2 1.91 2.39
(dof, p-value) (2, 0.39) (2, 0.30)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership share are instrumented. The
regressions also include controls for industry, experience and legal form.
Ownership share has a positive but insignificant influence on leverage. The insignificance
of the coefficient may be influenced by the weakness of the instruments applied to the
ownership variable. The controls for company size and company age do not influence leverage
either. In the IV regressions of the previous subsections we also found no influence of
company size and age on the demand for and supply of loans with the exception of a positive
influence of company age on loan supply. The test of overidentifying restrictions again
confirms the statistical validity of the instruments.
Strebulaev (2004) cautions that in the presence of adjustment costs cross-sectional rela-
tionships between leverage and other variables determined by empirical analysis may differ
from the relationships expected if variables are at their target level. The argument is illus-
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trated with the help of the trade-off theory which postulates a positive relationship between
leverage an profitability since the interest paid can be deducted from profits for the calcula-
tion of taxes. Even if the trade-off theory es valid, we may still observe a negative relationship
between leverage and profitability if profits are used to pay down loans and if leverage is
adjusted infrequently. In our case, both leverage and SNWI is likely affected by adjustment
costs. Higher profits will lead to lower leverage and, to a small degree, to lower values of
SNWI which could introduce a positive relationship between the variables. However, this
influence of profitability is removed from our analysis through the use of instruments which
are unrelated to profitability.
4.6 New Equilibrium Values for Leverage and the Interest Rate
The empirical results from the previous sections can be used to infer characteristics of the
demand for and supply of leverage in a structural model. The market constellation must
exhibit an unchanged interest rate and increased leverage after an increase in SNWI. There
are two possible constellations illustrated in panels A) and B) of Figure 1 that fulfill these
conditions. The original demand and supply curves for leverage are denoted by D and S,
while the demand and supply curves after an increase in SNWI are denoted by D’ and S’.9
Empirically, we cannot infer the slopes of demand and supply, γ1 and γ2. We need to
work with assumptions with respect to their signs. The demand function is identical in panel
A) and B). We assume a negative influence of the interest rate, i.e. a negative value for γ1,
since there is no indication that demand for leverage would behave in a non-standard way.
Our probit regression on probability of loan application revealed a positive effect of SNWI,
from which we conclude that higher values of SNWI lead to a higher demand for leverage,
hence we confirmed our expectation that β1 of the structural equation of the demand for
leverage (1) is positive. For the structural equation of supply of leverage (2) we differentiate
9The whole analysis is performed under the ceteris paribus assumption. For example, the demand function
shows how demand for leverage changes for different interest rates when SNWI is held constant. In practise,
the additional loans that lead to an increase in leverage could be used to decrease equity; as a result, SNWI
would decline. Alternatively, one can implicitly assume that additional loans are used to increase the total
assets of a company and not to substitute equity capital. The shift in SNWI is also considered under the
ceteris paribus assumption. Otherwise, a change in SNWI caused by a change in equity would also influence
leverage if total debt did not change in the same proportion.
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Figure 1: Change in Market Equilibrium Consistent with Empirical Evidence
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two situations. First, panel A) depicts the situation of a finite γ2. In this case the interest
rate is an increasing function of leverage. In the equilibrium after an increase in SNWI we
have no change in the interest rate, therefore the supply of leverage has to increase. In
our empirical analysis we found no influence of SNWI on the probability of a loan approval.
However, we could not exclude the possibility that owners use underdiversification as a signal
of company quality. In this case β2 is positive. Second, panel B) displays the situation of a
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price-insensitive supply function (γ2 infinity). The supply function is flat; the interest rate
does not depend on the level of leverage.10 For this to be consistent with an unchanged
interest rate, we need to have that underdiversification is not signalling company quality, i.e.
β2 equal to zero.
Overall, our empirical analysis finds that underdiversification leads to higher leverage
through the channel of an increased demand. The empirical results have important impli-
cations for our understanding of the capital structure of private companies. We find that
entrepreneurs who are more exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies use bank
financing more extensively. Bank financing allows them to grow their companies without
increasing their risk exposure further. Alternatively, entrepreneurs can use bank financing to
reduce their own investment. Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity
capital and accordingly the required returns of an investment project, this also means that
the availability of bank loans makes the realisation of some investment projects profitable
that would not be realised in its absence.
5 Conclusions
The financing of private companies relies to a large extent on the personal resources of their
owners. Equity investments often amount to a substantial share of owners’ total net worth,
which leads to underdiversification in their overall portfolios. Since the underdiversification
of owners increases the cost of equity capital substantially, it should have an important
influence on the capital structure of private companies. If owners try to equalise the marginal
cost of equity and debt financing, companies led by more highly underdiversified owners
should use higher values for leverage. This is the core hypothesis tested in this paper.
Using survey data on private companies in the US, we find that underdiversification
increases demand for loans, measured as probability of loan application. For supply of
loans we find no effect of underdiversification, but we cannot exclude the possibility that
underdiversification increases the supply of loans through a signalling mechanism. We also
10The supply function in panel B) is drawn as solid line. This suggests that banks hardly vary the interest
rate for different volumes of external financing which they provide. However, in a situation of credit rationing
it would also be possible that companies do not obtain the full amount demanded at the given interest rate.
26
discuss how underdiversification affects equilibrium values of interest rates charged for new
loans and leverage. Interest rates are not influenced by underdiversification, possibly because
banks are unwilling to increase interest rates in response to higher demand for bank loans.
The higher demand for new loans is manifest in higher values for leverage in companies
whose owners are more underdiversified. This paper identifies underdiversification of owners
as a statistically and economically important influence on the capital structure of private
companies.
In future research it would be of interest to test whether the effect of underdiversification
on leverage found for private companies also exists for public companies. On theoretical
grounds, we would also expect an effect for public companies with a concentrated ownership
structure. It may be possible to use public companies in which families or founders hold
high ownership shares for a corresponding test.
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Appendix
Table A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company information
Number of employees 27.6 5 57.1 1 482
Company age (in years) 15.2 12 12.5 1 104
Loan application 0.254 0 0.436 0 1
Loan approval 0.769 1 0.422 0 1
Interest rate of most recent loan (in %) 8.90 8.75 2.05 2.00 16.00
Risk premium of most recent loan (in %) 3.46 3.32 2.10 -3.62 10.8
Leverage (in %) 32.6 25.6 31.1 0 99.8
Owner information
Net worth (in million US-$) 1.50 0.416 4.38 0.0001 116
SNWI A (in %) 25.8 17.8 25.1 0.004 100
SNWI B (in %) 31.6 21.9 29.7 0.01 100
Ownership share largest owner (in %) 80.0 100 27.6 1 100
Experience of owner (in years) 19.7 19.0 11.8 0 72
Owner age (in years) 51.2 51 11.3 21 95
Owner sex dummy 0.22 0 0.41 0 1
Economy-wide interest rate information
Prime rate (in %) 8.22 8.25 0.33 7.75 9.00
Term structure spread (in %) 0.30 0.23 0.31 -0.16 1.4
Default spread (in %) 2.01 2.12 0.36 1.45 2.65
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reflect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy.
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Table B: Industry Distribution
Industry No. of companies % of companies
SIC 1 – Mining, construction 261 9.8
SIC 2 – Manufacturing 130 4.9
SIC 3 – Manufacturing 178 6.7
SIC 4 – Transp., communication, utilities 96 3.6
SIC 5 – Retail trade 736 27.6
SIC 6 – Real estate 153 5.7
SIC 7 – Services 623 23.4
SIC 8 – Services 489 18.3
Total 2666 100
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reflect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy.
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